

THE DIRECTOR OF
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29 August 1984

NOTE FOR: DCI
DDCI

FROM : MG Edward B. Atkeson, USA
NIO/GPF

SUBJECT : Book Review of Operation Barbarossa

The thesis of Bryan Fugate's newest work is so revolutionary regarding surprise in World War II--and deception continuing to the present day--that you may find the attached draft review of particular interest. Practically all previous works have depicted the German invasion of the USSR as a surprise to the Soviet leadership. Fugate says, "not so." The game was actually a colossal trap designed by Zhukov. If Fugate is right, history must reconfirm Stalin as an extremely clever, but unscrupulous monster with little concern for the lives of his troops in the field--or of their commander, General Pavlov, whom he had shot.

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Edward B. Atkeson

Attachment

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BOOK REVIEW

Studies in Intelligence

Operation Barbarossa: Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front, 1941

By Bryan Fugate, Presidio Press, Novato, CA; 1984; 415 pp.

Far from being surprised by the Nazi assault in June 1941, Stalin and Zhukov, the principal architect for the defense, actually were superbly prepared for it and arranged the Soviet forces to suck the Germans into the dreadful Russian killing ground, far to the east. So argues Bryan Fugate in this stunning revisionist interpretation of events surrounding the greatest cataclysm of modern times. Actually, Fugate suggests, Stalin would have preferred the war to come two years later when Soviet forces would have been prepared to take the offensive at the outset, but he was quite satisfied to deal with it in 1941, confident that he could lead the Germans to their deaths deep inside the USSR.

Operation Barbarossa carefully documents a case for a colossal deception perpetrated against Hitler and his staffs--and, incidentally, against the Soviet people themselves--and one which continues to this very day. Contrary to the poor intelligence held by Colonel Kinzel's "Foreign Armies--East" section of the German General Staff (OKH), Soviet forces deployed in the border areas in June 1941 were not the cream of the Red Army, and they were deliberately deprived of modern equipment, particularly tanks and aircraft. Much of their artillery was withdrawn before the Nazi assault, nominally "for training" in the rear. The real military strength of the Soviet Union was

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being concentrated in a second "operational" echelon some 500 kilometers to the rear and, subsequently, in a third, "strategic" echelon still deeper in the interior. Zhukov's strategy, which he had developed in wargames in January 1941, was to lure the German panzer groups beyond the support of foot-mobile infantry and then to unleash the fury of the Soviet combined arms counteroffensive, spearheaded by the new T-34 tanks and supported by new MIG-3 fighter aircraft. The decisive battles would be fought after the German logistical train had been severely stretched, not in the forward areas where everything favored the invader.

Fugate makes a startling case for the extent of the Soviet deception based largely on German documents. The Germans thought they faced the flower of Soviet strength in the border area, some 10 armies, backed by a fortified belt--the "Stalin Line" 200-300 kilometers to the rear. They estimated that if they could penetrate these zones in the summer months the Soviet Union would be theirs for the taking. They had not counted upon the Russian principle of surprise operation--dubbed reflexive control--involving deception to the point of mind control over the opponent. Unfortunately, the case cannot be fully corroborated on the Soviet side because of continued secrecy in the USSR.

So dense was the cloud of secrecy over the defensive plan, argues Fugate, that major aspects cannot be opened up even today. Fugate points out the curiosity of the arrest and execution of the forward area commander, General Pavlov, after his weakened defenses were penetrated (the only front commander to be "liquidated" in World War II). In disgrace and death, Pavlov had to be made to serve the fiction that he had held the single greatest hope for the

defense of Mother Russia. Actually, his was a hollow command, designed to deceive the Germans, delay as it could, and then to submit to massacre or capture by the enemy. This first echelon was never intended to halt the attack. However, the Soviet regime has yet to say anything about a plan to deliberately entice the German invasion on to Soviet soil, nor does it admit to any strategy other than the mounting of a vigorous defense at the frontier. The official position remains as Khrushchev related it in his de-Stalinization speech in 1956, that Stalin was inept and surprised by the German attack.

Fugate, however, musters persuasive arguments for the deception thesis:

- The Soviet withdrawal of artillery from the forward areas before the invasion.
- The rapid regroupment of the Red Army in the late summer and early fall after sustaining severe losses close to the frontier in June.
- The appearance of T-34 and KV tanks, along with the latest model MIG-3 aircraft in October, after the Germans thought they had destroyed the bulk of Soviet armor and air forces.
- The Soviet counteroffensive of December 1941 around Moscow with a force of seven armies--50 percent larger than Wehrmacht forces in the area.

But Fugate does not credit all of the Soviet success to the genius of Stalin and Zhukov. Incredible German intelligence blunders, matched with good intelligence on the Soviet side contributed significantly. In 1940 the German High Command (OKW) estimated that 80 to 100 German divisions would be required to execute the campaign in four to six weeks against "fifty to seventy-five good divisions" of the Russians. On July 2, 1941 Colonel Kinzel reported to General Halder, Chief of the General Staff, that the Russians had only between 21 and 26 divisions remaining facing the German Army Groups North and Center. This prompted Halder to estimate the conclusion of the campaign to be less than two weeks off. The cold realization of Kinzel's errors became obvious to all the following month when 360 Russian divisions had been identified across the eastern front.

On the other hand, the Rote Kapelle ("Red Choir") Soviet spy network was functioning in high gear inside Hitler's headquarters, transmitting streams of high-level intelligence to Moscow. F. I. Golikov, the Soviet General Staff Intelligence Chief, accurately summarized the evolution of the "Barbarossa" plan to Zhukov in March 1941, three months before the attack. On September 14th Richard Sorge, the Soviet spy in Tokyo, notified Moscow Center that the Japanese would make no move against the Soviet Union, facilitating the shift of additional forces from east to west.

Another contributor to Soviet success was the strict control which Stalin enjoyed over his field commanders through the NKVD, while the Germans struggled with a confusing command structure which enabled head-strong field commanders, such as Guderian, to ignore inconvenient orders from higher authority. It never was very clear on the German side whether Moscow or the

Ukraine was top priority. (The only thing that was clear to everyone was that no one should ever try to detach a unit from Guderian's Panzer Group 2.) The strict control on the Russian side insured a singleness of purpose which the Germans could never attain. Fugate singles out Guderian for special fault, describing his role as pivotal in the survival of the Hitler regime in the period of anti-Nazi plots and virtually decisive in Germany's loss of the war and the ultimate extension of Soviet power into central Europe.

Operation Barbarossa opens an entirely new thesis regarding the greatest military struggle of the century. While it has its technical faults (so-so maps, typographical errors), it will give soldiers, scholars and, most particularly, intelligence officers cause to reexamine their views of the events which have shaped conventional wisdom in the past. "Must" reading for everyone concerned with warning, deception and surprise.

Edward B. Atkeson